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Summary
This article, part of my autobiography that looks at my life from childhood to my 
rather old age, seen in relation to European history and dominated by the laborious 
construction of a supranational association of states. When the first attempt by a small 
group of states saw the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), I 
was very glad and even more so seeing a few years later the birth of the three European 
Communities. The following period saw a flowering of industrial activity. The same 
Italy, a mainly agricultural state, soon became an important industrial one: even more 
so as part of the European Communities (EC).
* giuliano Bellezza, PhD. Prof., home of geography, Villa celimontana, Via della Navicella 
12, i-00184 Roma, italy; email: giuliano.bellezza@uniroma1.it
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Somehow disappointed by the French reluctance to welcome the United Kingdom, 
I was eventually glad when in 1973 there was the first accession. Unfortunately, shortly 
afterwards it became clear that the primary interest of the United Kingdom was not 
European, but trans-Atlantic in nature. In any event, some years later the accession 
of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, seen by a young Italian man working in a university, 
in the Faculty of Humanities, this was pure cultural honey. However, real life also 
showed a division between modern, more developed states in the northern European 
Union (EU), and the poorer Mediterranean area.
After the economic boom, in the 1980s, things were no longer so good: not bad, 
yet, but perhaps stagnating, and in many states the public expenditure were more than 
revenue, meaning more public debt.
A turning point came in 1989 with the disruption of the Soviet Union and a large 
number of Eastern European states asking to join. At the time I had already become 
somehow selective: I feared that in a community, more is not necessarily better. At 
the same time two big decisions were discussed: the adoption of a common currency, 
and not all the 15 members accepted it; the free movement of people inside the EC, 
and even in this case there were opposition. Free movement of capital and not of 
people? No, this was not my idea for a democratic community. The population of the 
subsequent twelve new member states, on the opposite, were glad to move westwards 
in search of employment.
The failure of the Leman Brothers Bank provoked a global crisis, and when some 
recovery was beginning, three more, very bad events occurred: the economic failure 
of Greece, the birth of ISIS – the only aggressive Muslim movement in the Southern 
Mediterranean coast – and the crisis in Ukraine. For some days there has been war, 
not in EU, but on its borders. Spring 2015 begins in the worst ever period of the EC, 
and our common future seems to me ever more doubtful.
1	 The	first	Six
i have had an opinion on the European communities (Ec) since the institution 
of the first European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): I was 14, and my feeling 
was based on my previous war experience. my experience, very little indeed, occurred 
from 5-8 years old, in Rome [Roma]: at that time i was proud, because, thanks to my 
child’s ration card I received  milk, bread, pasta, wheat flour and oil for a special price, 
more than other members of the family. however, surely, no special treatment could be 
expected during bombings: a very fearful kind of noise.
I felt that the war was really finished when I was nearly nine, and could spend 
some days in the countryside; the first night, newly arrived, I ate two eggs in a single 
meal: I could easily have had one more, just asking, but I was satisfied, indeed. The 
difference between peace and war appeared to me with shining evidence became 
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clear to me in a matter of seconds. consequently, years later, i was very happy for 
the institution of the various Ecs: i perceived it to be insurance against war and was 
optimistic about its future development.
in italy it is commonly said that at the base of the Treaty of Paris (signed in 1953) 
was the italian manifesto di Ventotene, written by some italian intellectual opponents 
to fascism and, as such, restricted for years in the small island of Ventotene. Their 
intention was to develop an alliance at the end of World War ii to avoid any more war 
in Europe, and this was what france proposed to germany with the monnet-schumann 
Declaration. Not the german composer, this Robert schumann was the french minister 
of foreign Affairs. italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and luxembourg could enter in the 
European coal and steel community (Ecsc) as founders. The economic success went 
beyond any forecast, especially for a country such as italy, lacking coal as well as iron. 
The ‘six’ decided to enlarge the cooperation to the sectors of industry, agriculture and 
the peaceful use of atomic energy, which happened in 1958, with the Treaty of Rome 
(my town, one more reason of enthusiasm).
first critic: the schuman Declaration used a very simple language, proposing clear 
objectives and how to obtain them. The treaties of Rome proposed greater objectives 
and goals, but the language is very diplomatic: the governments had no difficulties 
applying the disposition in a way well adapted to their national interests. Nothing 
has been said about common military force, as the United Kingdom was in strong 
opposition, so as not to disturb the common operation under the umbrella of NATO 
(clearly directed by UsA).
A common market is a friendly economic organisation, and consequently german 
war debts were significantly reduced, to be slowly given back; moreover, in the time of 
free movement relative to steel industry, italy could maintain for some years custom 
fees on such products. Only thanks to this more than peaceful attitude did the steel 
production start in italy an incredible cycle of growth: from four to more than 22 
million tons in the period 1954-1964, and custom fees could be abolished in a few 
years. german, french or italian big automobile producers could have easily invaded 
the Netherlands, but a gentleman’s agreement allowed Dutch car enterprise DAf to 
continue its activity.
it should also be stressed that the very peaceful Treaties of Rome had been signed 
during the coolest period of the cold War: for the six, the following years are still 
remembered as “the Economic Boom”.
Yet, some kind of globalisation was beginning: 1957-58 was also the international 
Year of science, when scientists of the UsA and the soviet Union decided to exchange 
information, trying to make it possible to carry out joint research; scientists of nearly 
all the world applauded enthusiastically. The end of the international Year didn’t stop 
the cooperation, and amongst the first global outcomes was the plate tectonics theory. 
All this seems incredible, because in the same time East-West cold War also was 
based just on science-based weapons of mass destruction. (The space race was not 
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totally inspired by a peaceful approach.) i was ending my university studies, studying 
geological science, and i became ever more convinced: the best tools to make peace 
could be provided by science.
One more event has to be remembered. in 1960, Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, sweden, switzerland and the United Kingdom founded the European free 
Trade Area (EfTA), a kind of international organisation allowing economic activities 
to operate in the area with no restrictions: the most powerful could enlarge, swallowing 
the smaller. many liberal (maybe too many) economists were convinced that the free 
market was more efficient than a common market, while inside the communities, EFTA 
was interpreted as an attempt to boycott Es, triggered by the United Kingdom.
soon after and in the following years, the economic success of Ecs remained 
incomparably superior.
2	 From	Six	to	Nine
The following events, until the joining of the United Kingdom, have been 
influenced by relevant changes. The first has been the election of De Gaulle as 
president of france. in his vision, the European communities should become an entity 
not simply competing in economy and culture with the UsA and the soviet Union, 
but with the aim to win. france should use the EU rules to this end, with minimum 
delegation of national sovereignty. New members would be welcome, but accepting of 
the tendency to world primacy, excluding war, of course.
At the same time, germany could no longer be ironically dubbed the “economic 
giant and political dwarf”. Ten years after the Treaty of Rome nothing relative to 
Germany could be defined as dwarf. France, with De Gaulle and his foreign affairs 
minister, couve de mourville, and germany, with chancellor Adenauer and minister 
hallstein, were on opposite fronts on many issues, but agreed on the construction of 
a strong Ec, able to compete with the two superpowers. Ten years after the Treaties 
of Rome, the EC figures of growth in Gross Domestic Product, private consumption, 
salaries and commerce – internally as well as internationally – were by far better than 
that of the UsA, and the soviet Union couldn’t even to be taken in consideration. To 
remember the short opinion of the former English Prime minister Winston churchill: 
“the UssR has not the possibility to produce at the same time enough butter and guns”. 
The space race spoke clearly: the Soviet Union launched the first men in orbit in 1961, 
but only seven years later, the USA sent the first men to the moon, and brought them 
back safely.
The EC wasn’t investing much in this field, but preferred to develop the steel 
industry: the former german ‘Konzerne’ in the Ruhr region, whose production 
had been strongly reduced for some years, were now surpassed by the new coastal 
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integrated complexes in france, Belgium, Netherlands and italy, so that Ec soon 
became the world’s largest producer. in the same coastal areas, a number of very large 
oil refineries were constructed, and in this field also the EC soon reached pole position 
in the world.
By the mid-1960s, the problem of a United Kingdom accession couldn’t be 
avoided, the main problem being that the french President De gaulle had a strong 
Euro-continental vision, while the United Kingdom’s one was very atlantic, and in 
discussions its delegates were limited by their international relations with UsA. france 
demonstrated its reluctance to follow UsA pre-eminence in NATO, withdrawing from 
this military alliance, then proposing a common leadership (‘directorium’) in the Ec 
to germany, but in this case germany didn’t accept. Of course, germany had a strong 
moral debt to the UsA, having been designated as main shield against a possible soviet 
invasion of Europe. This had given an advantage to germany, forcing it in the same 
time to demonstrate gratitude to UsA.
All the rules of Ec had been established after years of discussions, and the United 
Kingdom (UK) wanted to discuss everything again, before joining: most of all, the 
UK representative seemed to consider joining to be a concession to Ec. Even worst, 
sometimes they didn’t appear well-prepared on the discussion themes. Of course, there 
were very different economic interests. To quote but one, in international commerce 
the Ec countries had to apply similar rules to the rest of the world, and france – only 
after long difficult discussions – obtained particular relations for the former African 
colonies. The UK asked for exceptions not only for former colonies, but even more 
comprehensively for all of the Commonwealth: finding a solution was very difficult. 
in any event, it appeared evident that all the countries, including the six founders, were 
more than reluctant to cede a minimum of sovereignty to the Ec, especially in the 
international contacts with the rest of the world. some weeks before the signature, the 
UK wanted to establish a permanent information exchange with UsA, under french 
pressure the Ec refused to accept and the UK opposed a veto to a joint conference of 
EC with the oil-exporting Arab countries. Difficult to understand, in the time of Yom 
Kippur War, with the following incredible oil price growth. following february 1974, 
only french opposition blocked Ec accession to a UsA-led coalition of oil importers 
to oppose the Arab oil producers. Years before, De gaulle feared the UK was a UsA 
Trojan horse in the Ec, and surely the UK was demonstrating to be still following 
churchill’s recommendations on the three circles of special relations: commonwealth, 
the UsA, Europe, but not European communities. i slowly began thinking that le 
général had probably been right: once a fan of an Ec enlargement, i began thinking it 
better to adopt a more selective attitude.
Together with the UK, ireland, Denmark and Norway also applied: all of them 
members of EfTA, with the exception of ireland strictly tied to the UK, anyway. To solve 
the problem, in the agreement signed 22nd January 1972, the status of Associated states 
was created from 1973, leaving them four more years to solve the custom problems 
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with the remaining EfTA members. During 1972, all the new potential members 
organised a national referendum on the issue. To universal surprise, the Norwegian 
population rejected joining. some said because of the fear of being invaded by poor 
southern immigrants or by foreign fishing boats in the rich Norwegian waters, other 
gave responsibility to the recent discovery in these waters of rich offshore oil fields. 
someone, however, proposed a fourth explanation: young Norwegians couldn’t deny 
the economic success of Ec, but were criticising the lack of advanced social public 
structures: they wished the institution of Ec to take social equity more seriously, and 
not only economic success; moreover, they criticised all the Ec states, for paying too 
much attention to national, instead of common interests. in that time i tried to persuade 
myself that this was what the young Norwegians really wanted; thinking today, i am 
afraid, this only means i was still too romantic. The decisive Norwegian reasons had 
been, most likely, the first quoted.
In fact, after the first halcyon years, the level of action by the EC decision-making 
institutions, where all the member states appoint a representative, had lowered: the 
members were no longer only dedicated and expert persons. They were chosen now 
by each country’s most powerful party, and with the new countries, their members 
were to be augmented. The most important institutions are the council of ministers 
(or simply council) and the Executive commission. The ministers (of agriculture, 
industry or other, depending on the discussed issues of the day) are nominated by 
different countries to represent national interests. Obtaining advantages depends on 
their personal negotiating ability: nobody could blame them, this being their duty. To 
avoid confusion, the very similarly named European council is made up of the head of 
state or government, with no legislative power, only providing the Union with general 
political directions and priorities.
The most important Ec institution is surely the Executive commission. its 
members should only work in the common interest of Ec; they elect a commission 
Chair, and during their five-year term, as well as the chair, they must forget their 
nationality. in many national parliaments, the stronger party alone decides who 
nominate in the commission, but as a whole the commissions have not been criticised, 
beating all suspects. After 1979, when the first European Parliament was elected, 
these national representatives were subject to the parliament approval: this is a serious 
examination, and sometimes the nomination has been denied.
The six were ironically called “the little Europe”, and with the enlargement the 
surface grew from 1.164 to 1.523 million km². still small, compared to the 9.636 million 
km² of the UsA or 22.275 million km² of the soviet Union, but “little Europe” wasn’t 
used any more. Probably the reason is due to the population growth, from 191.107 to 
254.9 million, this also to be compared with UsA, 208.8, and soviet Union, 247.5.
however, a handicap remained the lack of common foreign policy. The Ec didn’t 
have reserves of oil or gas (except for the promising discoveries in the North sea), and 
all countries were looking for supplies. The soviet Union could easily persuade single 
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Ec members to negotiate, separate from the others, obtaining special prices to buy oil, 
gas and more, while the Ec as a whole could have bargained better. however, the Nine 
had even less common foreign policy than the six, something, which was destined to 
increase following further accessions: this still remains the main limitations to building 
a real entity worth of being called a community (and today Union).
Table 1: Europe	of	Nine,	statistical	figures,	1973
STATE 1,000 km² 1,000 resid. density
Belgium 30.5 9,711 318
Denmark 46.1 4,992 116
france 547.0 51,700 95
germany 248.5 61,674 248
ireland   70.3 3,014 43
italy  301.2 54,345 180
luxembourg     2.6 347 133
Netherlands 36.6 13,330 364
United Kingdom 244.0 55,788 229
eU Comm. 1,523.8 254,901 167
soviet Union 22,275.1 247,459 11
UsA 9,363.1 208,842 22
The sources of the tables and the figure have been taken from the official annual and quarterly 
publications of EUROsTAT, like Eurostat Pocketbook – Key figures on Europe; Eurostat 
compact guides-Basic figures on EU;  Eurostat Regional Yearbook.
3	 From	Nine	to	Fifteen	and	to	the	Soviet	disruption
The Nine suddenly had to face the oil crisis following the Arab-israel war of 
1973. israel won by far, with the usual decisive help of UsA, conquering some more 
parts of Palestinian territory. The growing oil prices had a strong impact on all the Ec 
industrial activity, based on oil import and manipulation, and covering the majority of 
energy needs. Today we can blame the absence of environmental care, but, as a matter 
of fact, nobody cared about this kind of problem in that time. Private car circulation 
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was very often prohibited on sunday, but just to spare gasoline: no one cared too much 
for the existence of particulate, as few scientists knew about. The United Kingdom had 
been lucky enough to find offshore oil, and the Netherlands also found some productive 
fields of this kind. For all the others it became crucial not to antagonise the Arab states 
or the soviet Union, always without a common foreign policy.
A good step toward a more unified Union was the first election of a European 
Parliament in 1979, which has ever since been elected every five years. It has legislative 
power, but only for special procedures; usually it only adopts the law proposals of the 
commission; on the other hand, it nominates the president of the commission, and 
examines the commission’s proposal before ratifying; in case of dissention. still, the 
commission remains the main proposer of laws, giving the voters for Parliament a 
sense of disillusion: not surprisingly the turnout always remained low. The European 
citizens seem to believe the Parliament a rather useless institution.
Notwithstanding some dissatisfaction among the Ec members, other states wished 
to join, but didn’t match the requirements of democracy. As soon as dictatorships were 
overcome, greece in 1981, spain and Portugal in 1986 could join, so lifting to twelve 
the number of Ec members.
Table 2: Europe	of	Twelve,	statistical	figures,	1986
STATE 1,000 km² 1,000 inhab. density
Belgium 30.5 9,858 323
Denmark 43.1 5,111 118
france 547.0 54,335 100
germany 248.5 61,021 248
greece 132.0 9,741 74
ireland 70.3 3,537 51
italy 301.2 57,291 190
luxembourg 2.6 365 141
Netherlands 36.6 14,529 428
Portugal 92.4 10,129 110
spain 504.7 38,342 76
United Kingdom 244.0 55,058 229
eur. Comm. 2,256.0 319,317 137
UsA 9,363.1 233,980 25
soviet Union 22,275.1 278,784 13
sources: see Table 1
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With the new members, the mediterranean area, cradle of European culture, 
was in the Ec: something that i was very glad of. The North-south economic gap 
enlarged beyond any doubt, but considering also the situation of ireland, this could 
better be called as a centre-periphery gap. A European fund for Regional Development 
was established, to help the more disadvantaged regions. in the theme of population 
movements, the south to North immigration had stopped in the early 1970s, as all 
industry were suffering from the recent oil crisis. To facilitate population movements 
inside the Ec, in 1985 an agreement was established in schengen: at the moment it 
was only a proposal for the gradual abolition of border checks. five years later, the 
schengen convention proposed the institution of a schengen Area, operating like a 
single state: a total abolition of internal border checks, while enforcing control for 
travellers and merchandise entering or exiting the area. Even states outside of the Ec 
could possibly participate, it was written.
At the same time, the Ec began to be seen as an attractive area for immigrants 
not only from developing countries to the traditional industrial destinations, such as the 
United Kingdom, france, Netherlands or germany. Now, two new different immigrant 
movements, though still small, began to arrive: one, under the influence of the Catholic 
missions in india, latin America and in former African colonies, was composed of 
female housekeepers directed mainly to italy or spain, the other, more diffused and 
composed of people looking for employment coming from Eastern Europe.
This was interpreted as the final demonstration that the EC was now an international 
organisation, attractive, but also friendly. for dozens of years, nobody had shown 
aggressive intention to any part of it. i am not tired repeating that the Ec, becoming a 
wider and more populated entity should have more adequate foreign policy, while only 
France, no longer member of NATO, insisted for a Unified European Defence Force. 
in any event, no agreement could ever be reached. The majority of states seemed to be 
satisfied participating in NATO, without questioning the USA superiority. Most of all, 
the strength of the soviet Union appeared to be weakening, looking embarrassed and 
unable to stop the anti-Russian riots in Poland, under clear influence of the Vatican and 
Western powers.
An efficient minister of foreign affairs of the EC could probably put together 
the various different signals arriving from Eastern Europe: beginning with workers 
emigration, strong anti-Russian riots starting from the old major labourer strongholds, 
like Gdańsk, growing Soviet weakness in international activity as well as in space 
research. someone should have forecasted a possible great turmoil in the soviet Union. 
Nobody did, but this was exactly what happened, so the Ec arrived totally unprepared 
to the upside-down of 1989: for the second time, shortly after the oil crisis of 1973.
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4 eU of fifteen, Kosovo and euro
During the early 1990s, many decisions were made by the Ec, and not in the 
classical towns, like Brussels [Bruxelles/Brussel] or strasbourg. in 1992, in maastricht 
(Netherlands), the treaty merging the former communities (coal and steel, common 
market, Euratom) in a single European Union (EU) and deciding the adoption of a 
common currency, the Euro (€) was signed. The following year the schengen Treaty 
could become operative, though this happened only some years later.
Still in 1993, in Copenhagen [København], the criteria defining state eligibility 
for new members were defined. This was not relative to Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joining as they surely matched all the possible democracy requirements: their accession 
was completed in 1995, so beginning the EU of fifteen. The real problem concerned the 
important number of states wanting to join from the former Soviet sphere of influence 
and Yugoslavia, because this could open to NATO membership: an openly military 
alliance. The UsA was enthusiastic, but Russian opposition was even stronger. Once 
again the lack of a common foreign policy was felt by Europe, but the majority of 
politicians in the EU official agencies were unmoved.
in 1990, a very important event changed the geographical map of central 
Europe, when West and East Germany reunified. In that moment, Germany became 
the most populous state within the EU, with more than 80 million people, while the 
UK, italy and france were still below 60. since that moment germany became more 
internationally active.
from 1995, the member states began to join the schengen Area of free movements, 
and in 2000 all had joined with two exceptions: easy to understand, they were (and still 
are) the UK and ireland. The decision to leave free the movements of capital and not of 
people was, to my eyes, very bad, above all in the UK, where some islands are known 
as tax havens.
in 1998, the European monetary institute was substituted by a more powerful 
European central Bank, with a strong dissatisfaction for nearly all national central 
banks. The usual opposition by states to any kind of sovereignty mandate to Europe 
was even clearer when ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. here the maastricht 
decisions were definitively adopted, giving increased powers to the European 
Parliament, with an emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals, new rules 
on employment, aiming for a community area of freedom, security and justice. At last 
the necessity to reform the institutions for the next foreseen enlargements was stressed 
and the necessity of a common foreign and security policy was also mentioned, but 
with very little success. many states tried to oppose to a more powerful parliament, 
and I’m still trying to find an answer to a simple question: why did they adhere to a 
supranational Union?
in any event, this had been the more active decade of the EU, but procedures 
remained intolerably slow. The text of the Amsterdam Treaty was completed in 
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Amsterdam in June 1997, but negotiations began in messina in June 1995. The text 
was then signed in October and endorsed by the parliament in November. Eventually, 
but only after two more referenda and thirteen ratifications by national parliaments, the 
procedure was at last approved. With Norway the only exception, all the democratic 
countries of Western Europe were joined in a supranational unity, whose main scope 
was to avoid any war in the continent. This was, i thought, the realisation of the 
manifesto di Ventotene and of the schuman-monnet declaration.
soon, the newly born EU was involved in the worst European scenario after 
World War ii: real wars among the different states in the Balkan region. serbia was 
always involved. NATO was in favour of a strong intervention to protect Kosovars, 
and following the idea of Us President clinton, france and the UK gave all possible 
Table 3: Europe	of	Fifteen,	statistical	figures,	1995
STATES 1,000 km² 1000 resid. density per km²
Austria 83.9 8,029 96
Belgium 30.5 10,130 332
Denmark 43.1 5,215 123
france 547.0 56,615 104
finland 338.1 5,078 15
germany 357.0 81,539 228
greece 132.0 10,264 78
ireland 70.3 3,526 51
italy 301.2 57,282 190
luxembourg 2.6 385 149
Netherlands 36.6 15,341 452
Portugal 92.4 9,853 107
spain 504.7 38,748 76
sweden 411.0 8,816 21
United Kingdom 244.0 58,395 239
european Union 2689.7 369,216 137
Russian fed. 17,073.0 148,249 9
UsA 9,363.1 289,162 28
sources: see Table 1
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support. given the geographical position, italy couldn’t refuse NATO forces the use 
of italian air space and of the NATO bases in italian territory. some EU states spoke 
against any kind of air bombing. Russia, openly in favour of serbia and wishing for 
only diplomatic intervention, sustained this position even in the UN security council. 
The East European states wishing to join in the EU succeeded in not taking a clear 
position, with the exception of slovakia, in favour, and Bulgaria, opposing. (Possible 
explanation in the relations with Russia: slovakia wanted the most political distance 
possible, Bulgaria wanted reduce this distance as much as possible.) in the rest of the 
world only Japan, malaysia and Australia were in favour of bombing, while china, 
india, indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan and others (nearly half of the world’s population) 
strongly condemned the bombing. Disagreement in the UN security council made it 
impossible to take a position.
However, on-the-ground fighting and air bombing took place in 1998-99, 
with thousands of casualties, largely civilians; in the following years, mass graves 
were discovered, and the dedicated UN international criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia, in The hague [‘s-gravenhage] condemned representatives of both serbia 
and of Kosovo for war crimes, and even criticised in some cases of NATO bombings. 
War had appeared once more in Europe, after 50 years and some EU members actively 
participated: surely not in the EU area, but just at walking distance.
5 new millennium begins with the euro and the largest 
enlargement ever
At the beginning of third millennium my romanticism was nearly at an end, and 
i was doubtful about the opportunities presented by the next round of EU enlargement, 
the biggest ever. still, when on the 1st January 2002, the Euro (€) became the official 
currency of EU. i took this as a good step in the right direction. however, a strong 
problem remained, as the European central Bank does not have a mint: all the currency 
is only minted by the national banks, though they are not free to mint as much as they 
want.
To my dismay, the same year, two EU states didn’t adopt the Euro: the rejection 
by the United Kingdom was nearly expected, while the Denmark refusal resulted 
somehow surprising. in any event they are expected to join and asked to try to meet 
the criteria to do so. A couple of years after, the expected main news was the accession 
to the EU of ten new members: cyprus, czechia, Estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, 
malta, Poland, slovakia, and slovenia. some more were in waiting, and joined in the 
following years: with Bulgaria, croatia and Romania the total number reached 28, 
and in 2014, serbia also began talks. The newcomers were expected to adopt the use of 
Euro, but six of them have not yet done so. Kosovo and montenegro decided to do so.
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As of 2014, the EU surface is 4.381 million km² and the population more than 507 
million. Now as a core part of EU law, all new EU member states are legally obliged to 
join schengen, as soon as technical requirements have been met; it now covers an area 
of 4.312 million km², with a population of more than 400 million people.
Table 4: Continental	Europe	of	Twenty	three,	statistical	figures,	2008
STATES Area 1,000 km² Population million Density
Austria 84.0 8.1 96
Belgium 30.5 10.4 504
czechia 79.0 10.2 129
Denmark 43.1 5.4 125
Estonia 45.2 1.4 30
finland 338.1 5.2 15
france 547.0 59.8 110
germany 357.0 82.5 231
greece 132.0 11.0 83
hungary 93.0 10.1 109
ireland 70.3 4.0 56
italy 301.3 57.9 192
latvia 64.6 2.3 36
lithuania 65.3 3.4 53
luxembourg 2.6 0.5 175
Netherlands 43.0 16.2 391
Poland 312.7 38.2 122
Portugal 92.4 10.4 113
slovakia 49.0 5.4 110
slovenia 20.3 2.0 99
spain 506.0 41.9 83
sweden 411.0 9.0 20
UK 244.0 61.4 252
european Union 3,777.8 459.7 121
  
Russ. fed. 17,073.0 144.5 8
UsA 9,363.1 290.8 31
sources: see Table 1
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some EU functionaries tried to write a European constitution, but in 2004 in 
Rome [Roma] many states didn’t accept it. in 2007, a new text was proposed and 
discussed in lisbon [lisboa], and once again, it was not adopted. for the last time, i 
promise, i ask my usual question: why did they adhere to a supranational union and 
hold elections to have representatives in the parliament? Was it only to boycott the 
Union?
The first years of the 21st century could be a check about the willingness of the 
new members on the issue. Everybody knew that their economic figures were, in 2003, 
well below that of Western Europe, even when compared to the mediterranean states, 
known as the least developed within the EU.
 in the following year there were improvements everywhere: rather good in 
the northern, more advanced states, somehow less in the mediterranean, and better 
in the new member states. however, they were starting from a lower level: their per 
cent increases were high, but not that much in absolute data. This situation had been 
more or less forecasted, but in 2007 everything was suddenly turned upside-down by 
events in the UsA: the failure of the lehman Brothers (lBB Bank) resulted in a severe 
economic downturn, and this time global is the only adequate adjective. many critical 
economists said that this sudden turmoil wasn’t at all unexpected: the only doubt being 
why the major rating companies were still rating that bank as AAA.
The four graphs below show the evolution of significant figures from 2003 (the 
year before accession), 2008, when the lBB effect was felt, and 2012, when recovery 
was slowly proceeding. The acronym EAST here is the mean data relative to the new 
members from continental Eastern Europe (therefore, not including malta and cyprus). 
ADN means Austria, Denmark and Netherlands, as representatives of the wealthy part 
of EU, while GIP stands for greece, italy and Portugal, representative of the poorer 
part. italy is included in this category not so much for per-capita gDP, this being the 
same as registered in the United Kingdom, but for the state economic debt, among 
the worst of the world (old debts, mainly accumulated in the 1980s and early 1990s). 
inside the three categories there were differences from one country to another, but 
always small.
Per-capita gDP shows a similar trend across the three categories: good increases 
following enlargement and strong crisis following lBB. The interesting fact is that 
during the period the ADN figure passed from 33.6 to 39.7 thousand Euro, that is 
+18.1%. for the giP group the change has been from 20.4 to 22, growing only 13.7%; 
in Eastern Europe, gDP per capita passed from 7.1 to 11.5, an increment of 62%. 
Considering the inflation of the period, in Western Europe purchasing power remained 
on the same level, while in the new member states there has undoubtedly been an 
improvement.
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figure 1: Development	of	economic	and	welfare	indicators	2003-2012	by	country	
groups
gDP per capita Unemployment
     
social care Human	Development	Index
   
sources: see Table 1
Different were the trends in unemployment, apart the general trend of all the 
graphs: in the first year the unemployment was decreasing, and after LBB it started 
growing. in this case, ADN saw the unemployment grow 11.7% in eight years, while in 
giP the growth was an incredible 76.8%. Particularly surprising is the developmentin 
Eastern Europe: after the initial decrease an increase has been registered after lBB, 
but, all in all, in 2012 the unemployment was 0.8% less than it was when they joined. 
Both graphs show that for Eastern European countries, membership has proven to be 
a good choice.
The evolution of the state expenses for social care, a kind of investment lowering 
throughout Europe up until 2008 is different: in the aftermath all states tried to invert 
the trend, and in this case the best results were obtained in the mediterranean. This was 
the only area where, four years after lBB, the expenditure for social care was 7.2% 
more than in 2003. in the more wealthy countries there has been a decrease of 21.1% 
and, this also a surprise, the maximum decrease has been registered in Eastern Europe, 
with 22.3%.
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Table 5: European	Union	of	Twenty	eight,	statistical	figures,	2012
Name Area1,000 km2
Population
in millions Accession
Austria 83.9 8.451 1 Jan 1995
Belgium 30.5 11.161 founder
Bulgaria 111.0 7.284 1 Jan 2007
croatia 56.6 4.262 1 Jul 2013
cyprus 5.9 0.9 1 may 2004
czechia 78.9 10.516 1 may 2004
Denmark 43.1 5.603 1 Jan 1973
Estonia 45.2 1.325 1 may 2004
finland 338.4 5.427 1 Jan 1995
france 547.0 65.633 founder
germany 357.0 80.524 founder
greece 132.0 11.063 1 Jan 1981
hungary 93.0 9.909 1 may 2004
ireland 70.3 4.591 1 Jan 1973
italy 301.3 59.685 founder
latvia 64.6 2.023 1 may 2004
lithuania 65.2 2.972 1 may 2004
luxembourg 2.5 0.537 founder
malta 0.3 0.4 1 may 2004
Netherlands 41.5 16.78 founder
Poland 312.7 38.533 1 may 2004
Portugal 92.4 10.487 1 Jan 1986
Romania 238.4 20.058 1 Jan 2007
slovakia 49.0 5.411 1 may 2004
slovenia 20.3 2.059 1 may 2004
spain 504.0 46.704 1 Jan 1986
sweden 450.0 9.556 1 Jan 1995
United Kingdom 243.6 63.73 1 Jan 1973
sources: see Table 1
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The last graph refers to the human Development index, considered the most 
indicative, including wealth, education and life expectancy. 0.900 is considered the 
good level and in 2008 all the Western European states were well above 0.940, while in 
the Eastern part the mean was around 0.880 (with the wonderful exception of slovenia, 
at 0.920). Even this data followed the general trend, with an initial improvement 
everywhere, followed by the post-lBB decrease. The AND countries all remained 
above 0.900, while the mediterranean countries fell below 0.890 and the mean value 
in Eastern Europe lowered only from 0.853 to 0.846 in nine years.
in January 2014, serbia began accession negotiations, but there were still 
problems with the complete definition of borders with many Balkan entities. However, 
during that period many very difficult events occurred in the immediate surroundings 
of the EU and within the EU itself. The lack of a common foreign policy appears ever 
more serious, and the rapid increase from 15 to 25 and finally 28 members made things 
yet more difficult. I had always been doubtful about the enlargements: the peaceful 
and powerful Union, with members ready to help each other, which i had hoped for a 
long time ago, seemed to be vanishing. my old enthusiastic and optimistic spirit was 
shifting to a more pessimistic vision; in the concluding paragraph i’ll try to explain the 
reasons why my mood, far from improving, was – and continues – to worsen.
6 after 2012: greece and libya
germany, once a political dwarf, has long been seen as dominating the EU actions, 
but some economists now question its economic gigantism. it is a giant, beyond any 
doubt, but what is its health? And how much of it relies on control of the financial 
policy of the EU? maybe the austerity imposed on the EU, with the help of a few of 
the wealthiest states, is somehow advantageous to the economic giant and especially 
its banks?
The austerity imposed everywhere is the base of the populist, Eurosceptic and 
anti-Euro movements now growing everywhere, with a large number of supporters 
in the European Parliament. in the 7th Report on security in Europe of the Unipolis 
foundation (presented in the italian Parliament on 24th february 2015) showed that in 
all EU states the majority of the population asked does not trust the institutions; the 
only exception being germany, but even there, only with a meagre 53%. france and 
Poland follow, slightly above 40%. in Poland, 71% oppose the possible adoption of 
Euro, and this figure grows to 84% in the United Kingdom. In Italy, 30% will like to 
abandon Euro, and, believe it or not, 37% in Germany. In France the figure is about 
23%, but reaches 48% in what is now the strongest political party, the front National. 
speaking of parties, among members of Britain’s United Kingdom independence 
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Party (UKIP), 92% of supporters will oppose the adoption of Euro – a really difficult 
situation given that the common currency has been the major project proposed and 
approved in the EU, along with the institution of a central Bank: called central, but 
with no real influence on the various national banks.
let’s examine the major crisis now facing EU: as i wrote above, one is inside the 
EU – greece – and two on the borders: Ukraine and the so-called isil (islamic state 
of iraq and the levant). i don’t blame the Norwegians and swedish for not considering 
these as dramatic problems, but geographic position means something: in italy these 
really are fearful emergencies. seen from here, immediately after their solutions, a 
federal European Union appears possible to be shortly put on the agenda.
Beginning with greece, the problem here is an economic one, and doesn’t appear 
to be solved but only procrastinated following the proposal made by the greek Prime 
minister to gain some more time for an economic recovery. And today the ‘solution’ 
only demonstrates where the problem lies. The greek economic crisis originally 
started because of counterfeit appraisals of past governments; the debt to the EU being 
substantial, the subsequent governments asked for a long time to try and repay. With the 
intervention of European commission, central Bank and international monetary fund 
(IMF), the answer was hard-line: debt, fines and interests should be repaid quickly, 
starting immediately to gather money by means of an internal policy of restriction and 
austerity. forced to reduce social expenditure and with the impossibility of any kind 
of productive investments, the economic crisis grew immediately. By the way, almost 
being driven to default had been the result of the austerity imposed over some years 
by IMF and World Bank to countries in economic difficulty in all continents. Greece 
tried to find help in the EU, to no avail. There was no hope from the United Kingdom, 
always refusing to give one more pound to help EU budget, while some other states, 
e.g. finland, Norway and the Netherlands, joined germany in the steadfast refusal. The 
new party, syriza, and its founder and leader Tsipras, won by large margin and started 
a new round of negotiations with the European commission, imf and the European 
central Bank. it took some months for greece to obtain the actual four months delay 
(not a solution), while among the reluctant new members, slovakia found the time to 
clearly state its unavailability to any kind of help. What is to be stressed is that when 
European commission, central Bank and imf began to take a milder attitude, the 
opposition until a few days ago came from german chancellor, Angela merkel, and 
when she also appeared flexible, the strongest opponent became the Director of the 
german National Bank and the minister of finance. Once, when i was young and 
romantic, i would have asked how was it possible that the Director of a national bank 
and a minister could slow down a decision of international agencies and also of their 
Prime minister, but today i am rather sceptical, maybe cynical, surely pessimistic about 
the future of EC, without a rapid, radical change in the efficiency of its institutions.
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seen from italy, the second nearest crisis is on the southern mediterranean coast, 
where the so-called Arab Spring flowered in 2011. It appeared then that the main 
danger was the presence of the Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi, and following 
a joint initiative of the United Kingdom and france, favoured by NATO and UsA, 
some EU states (amongst them italy) gave armed support to the national rebels. for 
some international scholars (e.g. KaGan 2002) it is not completely true to say that the 
EU comes from Venus and Us comes from mars. The peacefulness of the EU appears 
somehow hypocritical: its weaponry is still relevant only against a land invasion 
from the East, and even in this case, it counts on the protection of the Us and NATO. 
This happened some years ago, during the wars among states emerging from former 
Yugoslavia (see above). After looking at the southern mediterranean coast, we’ll 
examine the Ukrainian case, finding an even stronger confirmation of this.
In Libya, Gaddafi was made prisoner and savagely killed, and ever since the 
country (?) has been governed (?) by chaos. After the Arab spring, no southern 
mediterranean state was able to establish what would be considered ‘democracy’ 
in the Western World: maybe it is time to question ourselves about many ‘Western 
values’, which we deem as universal (including democracy) and try to impose on 
peoples whose values are different, not to mention the methods we employ. This takes 
us to the most urgent emergency in libya, where a good part of the territory is now 
‘governed’ by the ISIL. Italy has for many years been an unwilling first refuge of poor 
immigrants, embarking from the libyan coast on derelict boats: about 160,000 landed 
in 2014, while some hundreds (maybe thousands) died, drowned in the sea (periodical 
publications of Amnesty international and caritas italiana). Europe considered this to 
be an italian problem, and some months ago forced italy to stop the program “mare 
aperto” (Open sea), accused of rescuing the shipwrecked, also in international waters. 
Once mare aperto was stopped, the EU started the “Triton” program in international 
waters, with a small number of European boats engaged in trying to stop and send back 
the boats overfilled with desperate people to Libya. This operation was an outrage, just 
on the basis of the so-called Western values; moreover, Triton’s efficiency was close 
to zero. After some time, italian values prevailed over the Western, and national coast 
guards and fisher boats started again to rescue the people on sinking boats as soon as 
they received an sOs, even those in international waters.
Things changed when isil moved out of its original areas in iraq and syria and in 
libya, monopolised the gesture of desperate people. There are hundreds of thousands 
of people on the libyan coast, mainly arriving from sub-saharan and Eastern Africa 
and now forced to depart, regardless of sea conditions. After a few miles the pilots 
activate the automatic pilot, leave to somebody a new mobile phone, take a speed boat 
and go back. in this way they earn money to operate in social media, sending every 
day alarms to italy, pretending to have missiles already pointed at sicily, possibly 
reaching as far as to Rome, and above all alerting about a terrorist invasion. Of course, 
no terrorist is likely to arrive on one of the old boats, which are very likely to wreck. 
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The real problem is that the appeals are aimed at convincing supporters in Europe to 
carry out terrorist attacks, even alone, to try and kill as many infidels as possible. It is 
worth noting here that an infidel is any human being not strictly following the opinions 
(fatwa) of the self-nominated caliph Al Baghdadi, and that the majority of their victims 
are shia muslims. The diffusion of outrageous killing of western hostages or christian 
copts, chaldea and others is part of their propaganda destined to the Western world.
many doubts exist about a real, solid connection between the middle Eastern 
isil and the libyan organisations, but stopping their internet activities aimed at 
stimulating terrorism in Europe is necessary. it is common knowledge that there are 
already hundreds of young muslims born in Europe, educated to values different from 
ours: for them carrying out a suicide bombing in a supermarket or attacking any store 
suspected of anti-islamic activity is a very good move. moreover, dying in action is 
the most valuable gesture to finish life and going directly to Paradise. This has already 
happened in central and Northern Europe, yet still, not enough attention has been 
paid to the isil presence in libya. The french President hollande, after two terrible 
terrorist attacks in Paris, was ready to send armed forces into libya, sure that he would 
find support from the United Kingdom, the USA, NATO, and possibly Italy, as four 
years before. however, the failure of the 2011 intervention was still too fresh, so only 
italy declared itself ready, but only after obtaining UN aegis: nothing has been decided 
yet. In the meantime the boats overfilled with desperate people are trying daily to land 
on the italian coast. The only cold comfort is that this is not the route of terrorists, 
while it is sad to note the usual powerlessness demonstration of the EU: passing to 
Ukraine we will talk about an even worse case.
7	 After	2012:	Ukraine
The actual causes of the Ukraine crisis are to be sought in the perennial conflict 
between the UsA and Russia. After some unpleasant Russian actions (Egypt, syria, 
Wikileaks/snowden), Obama began fostering the anti-Russia movements in Kiev 
[Kyiv]: the population of the Ukrainian capital, aiming to join the EU and NATO, 
began strong riots. President Yanukovych opposed with violence, until forced to resign 
(abandoning the country and finding refuge in Russia). With the EU remaining – as 
usual – without a firm position, the mere possibility of Ukraine joining NATO was 
enough for Putin to demonstrate decisive action: political, not based on weapons. 
he fostered a referendum in the crimea [Krim] to secede from Ukraine and enter 
in the Russian federation: the population being Russian-speaking, the result was a 
resounding approval.
The Us has a tendency to intervene without enough knowledge of a local 
situation, but it seems incredible that the EU didn’t know at the time of all the good 
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reforms done in recent years by Putin. his interventions received warm welcome from 
the middle and lower classes: more efficient public administration, more equality in 
taxation and more rapid justice, but most of all, minimum salaries had been raised. 
Nothing like this had been done yet in Ukraine, Belarus and other former members of 
the soviet Union. in the particular case of Ukraine, President Yanukovych, with close 
ties to Russia, had been on trial for bribery, as had previously happened to Yushenko 
and Timoshenko, who had already been convicted (pellicciari 2014).
Back in history, the original causes date from to 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev 
gave to Ukraine, then a member of the soviet Union, the oblast (region) of crimea. 
in 1991, Ukraine gave crimea the status of an autonomous republic (the same it had 
as part of the soviet Union). Eventually, in November 2013 the western Ukrainian 
population, anti-Russian and wanting to negotiate membership of the EU, began rioting 
against President Yanukovych in majdan square (central Kiev, so the movement took 
the name of Euromajdan). On the other hand, the Russian-speaking population in the 
eastern region of Ukraine supported the president’s position. The immediate response 
by the president in majdan was very hard, causing several casualties. As usual, the EU 
didn’t intervene, and the occasion was seized on by the ministers of foreign affairs 
for germany, france and Poland (this one representing all the new members): they 
went to Kiev, asking Yanukovych to adopt a milder approach, with no result. soon 
after, the Ukrainian army rebelled against the president, who was forced to seek 
refuge in Russia. Petro Poroshenko, elected president in the resulting election, soon 
tried to establish more contacts within EU for possible accession. in march 2014, 
crimea, with undeniable help from Putin, decided to secede from Ukraine, and was 
warmly welcomed into the Russian federation. The two eastern provinces of Ukraine, 
Donetsk [Donec’k] and lugansk [lugans’k], both with a strong majority of Russian-
speakers, also asked for independence. The Ukraine government tried once more to 
begin talks to enter in the EU (and NATO), finding a divided EU: not much enthusiasm 
was forthcoming in Western Europe with comprehensible reaction from Russia, and a 
strong, favourable attitude in the Baltic and Eastern states.
Poroshenko tried to frustrate the use of Russian language, and thus decided 
the population of the Donetsk and lugansk regions to follow crimea in requesting 
independence. The request was now unstoppable, and very hard, as it could trust on 
Russian forces deployed along the border. On the same level has been the reaction of 
the new Ukrainian President Poroshenko, who accused Putin of helping the secession 
and soon sent the army to Donetsk and lugansk, trying to block movements. An italian 
historian (caracciolo 2014b) tried to explain the final crisis, observing that Obama 
and Putin were losing control, the first over Poroshenko, the second over the Ukraine 
independence movements: that’s why the line between fierce fighting and war was 
soon crossed.
Of course, in this conflict the USA and Russia have different feelings: important 
but peripheral for the UsA while vital for Russia. The EU is in the middle, and with 
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its usual inability in foreign relations. This time the problem is more complicated than 
ever: while the EU and UsA have enjoyed centuries of uninterrupted friendship, it 
is not the case for Russia. in this case, there is today an insurmountable energetic 
dependence. This problem has been further complicated by the post-WWii desire to 
foster American interests.
It is necessary to look at the hydrocarbon traffic between the EU and Russia. 
The EU imports from Russia 24% of gas, and more than a half of that passes through 
Ukraine. Ukraine also imports from Russia, and pays for it, but not always; when this 
happens, Russia closes the supply, and no gas arrives in EU. Until 2011, when the 
North stream (a gas duct under the Baltic sea, also from Russia) began operations, 
the percentage of gas passing through Ukraine was 80% (floroS 2014a), and now 
the northern EU seems to no longer be having problems. This will probably have a 
positive influence on Merkel-Putin relations, explaining Merkel’s strong activities to 
facilitate the Russia-Ukraine dialog.
southern EU dependency on the Ukraine passage remains vital. Years ago 
attempts were made to realise a large gas pipeline called Nabucco (for some years 
dubbed ‘flag project’), relying on production from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran and 
iraq: too much for the UsA, which in hiding managed to impede the project: one of 
the usual mistakes of the UsA. As a matter of fact, Russia is developing a new line, 
starting from shah Deniz in Azerbaijan, the Blue stream (under the Black sea) and 
a trans-Turkey passage, will join a Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) to the Balkans and 
italy: this way all of Europe (not only the EU) will be embraced in a dangerous hug of 
Russian pipelines (floroS 2014b; indeo 2014) bypassing Ukraine. Beyond any doubt, 
Russia relies on European purchases, but is very careful to limit this dependence: a 30-
year agreement established in 2014 with china will easily substitute the income from 
Europe. starting from 2018, the contract speaks of 1 trillion m³, for a total payment 
in the range of 400 trillion Us dollars (payment in Yuan after some years). maybe 
Nabucco wasn’t a good solution, but now, with the exception of the northern states, the 
EU dependency on Russia is increased (floroS 2014a).
in the last globalised years, Us production has increased beyond any forecast, 
due to the non-traditional method of production: shale gas and fracking. can the EU 
take advantage of this production? Not really and for several reasons: non-traditional 
oil is more expensive, the Us is still using all of its production and, moreover, has not 
enough plants to liquefy the gas while, on the other side of the Atlantic, the EU has not 
enough plants for re-gasification. It has to be noticed that good possibilities for non-
traditional oil appear to exist also in Poland, czechia and slovakia but, different from 
Us, EU is still very cautious about this kind of production.
Back to Ukraine, it is rather easy to understand that the weapons the EU has to 
hand, such as threat of economic sanctions against Russia, cause little worry. The UsA 
is no longer available to support practical interventions and is very cautious about 
sending arms to the Ukrainian army, while EU members are divided on the problem. 
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The new members have a basic anti-Russian attitude, together with the fear of a strong 
Russian reaction, and understood that NATO protection is always less probable. The 
more established members are divided, with only Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, 
sweden (nearly) ready to intervene (caracciolo 2016); the others show no enthusiasm 
to participate, and only under the uncertain NATO umbrella. (Russia and the probable 
china vetoes will exclude the UN.)
for the past few months, the italian margherita mogherini has been responsible 
for the EU’s foreign affairs and has shown herself to be more willing to operate than 
the high representatives that preceded her. But she was not supported by the EU 
institutions. Everybody thought that in order to avoid war it was necessary to organise 
talks between the presidents of Ukraine and of Russia, with some arbitrators. After 
Obama, of course, being the most powerful man in the world, the second should 
obviously be the high Representative of the European Union for foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy: a denomination as flamboyant as it is empty. In fact, representing 
the whole EU was the french President, hollande, together with the german Prime 
minister, merkel; actually she could have gone alone. GiddenS (2014) stresses that 
in the EU the real decisions are not taken by the EU1, the official institution, but by 
a hidden EU2, mainly merkel. hollande accompanies her, while sarkozy could have 
once had some influence. Today all EU decisions are taken, overtly or behind the 
scenes, by germany: in this case overtly. The discussion reached a decision, to became 
effective not immediately, but with some days delay: after a couple of weeks some 
fights were still happening, and the rebel regions of Donetsk and Lugansk conquered 
some more km², including Debaltsevo, the main regional railroad hub. Now the crimea 
is de facto part of the Russian federation, and probably this will be the destiny of the 
self-nominated republics of Donetsk and lugansk. This region is important; in 1920 
Trotsky accused the European powers of fighting the Soviet Union not for democracy, 
but to access the coal of Donetsk and the iron ores of Krivoy Rog (lugansk).
8 trying to conclude
When in 2012 the EU was awarded with the Nobel Prize, a lot of people strongly 
criticised the decision. however, the motivations written by the committee are well-
balanced and undeniable, stating that EU had “for over six decades contributed to the 
advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”. in 
a synthetic sWOT analysis to highlight issues and assist in attempting a conclusion, 
these words expressing rather well the main strength of the EU, gave it a global good 
reputation.
The main weakness is the reluctance of all members to cede any part of 
sovereignty to the Ec institutions, giving it the reputation of a non-united union.
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The major threat is the difficulty to build multiracial and intercultural societies in 
countries where the population was used to emigration, and recently became desirable 
to very poor immigrants. Our poor people see the newcomers as disloyal competitors, 
accepting work for very little money.
Our major opportunity is the presence of a large population (only china and 
India are more populated), with a high degree of education and a sufficient computer 
literacy in young people, but: more in their use of social networks, than in their 
knowledge of computers.
however, the very good strength and opportunity are de facto weary, while the 
mentioned weakness and threat are hurdles that will be difficult to overcome. This 
weakness leads to the inability of the EU to adopt a real foreign policy, and this is a major 
handicap in all its relations with the rest of the world: enjoying a good moral reputation 
offers no economic advantages. in industrial as well as in agricultural economy, EU 
products encounter obstacles even in internal commerce and the situation is even worse 
when dealing with the rest of the world. Extending to the diffusion of cultural products, 
as movies and TV broadcasting, france obtained the adoption of a cultural exception: 
movies from the rest of the world shouldn’t be more than half of European television 
broadcasting. There has been no possibility for the European national television to 
do so, due to the concurrence of the private TV, which never considered following 
the law. Private television always and easily found in their country some political 
party taking their part, receiving in exchange favourable transmissions. This clearly 
demonstrates that the lack doesn’t concern only the EU foreign policy: there are no 
real common policies even within the EU, always due to the refusal of states to cede 
any sovereignty.
This a vital point: how much are EU member states really determined to realise 
the original goals of the monnet-schuman declaration? it related not only to the 
production of coal and steel use without custom fees, but for some years Adenauer, the 
german chancellor, left the coal mining region of saarland to france, and some years 
later france gave it back to germany. Both were available to cede not only sovereignty, 
but a material part of the state, though temporarily. since the United Kingdom joined, 
the impulse towards a real union faced more opposition. in any event, the EU was 
maybe the first economic entity of the world, with no political influence of the two 
superpowers, Us and soviet Union.
Not at all interested in a strong EU, in the 1980s the presidents of the superpowers 
changed the world asset: Reagan decided to definitely win the Cold War, helping the 
members of the Warsaw Pact, in the name of human rights. gorbachev decided that 
it was convenient for the soviet Union to give them more independence. in a matter 
of months, these states decided to take complete independence, and the iron curtain 
fell, with the physical destruction of the Berlin Wall. Actually, only one superpower 
remained, and the unified Germany became the most important member of EU. The 
new independent states wanted to join the EU, and the german chancellor, Kohl, saw 
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this as sure economic gain for his country and talks progressed quickly. i have already 
said that not all the community of 15 members really shares the original common 
goals, and this is even more so in the community of 28.
Let me pass now to the issue of threat, relative to the difficulty of building a 
solid multiracial and intercultural society. The problem is to give strength to a galaxy 
of movements asking for exits from EU and the Euro, as mentioned earlier in this 
article. in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, france and mainly italy (turato 
2014) they are divided from extreme neo-liberal right and extreme left, but discussing 
common action in the European Parliament, on the common anti-EU and anti-Euro 
base. it is a clear sign of diffuse europhobia, and the explanation is not on the side of 
the demand, but on the side of the offer (caracciolo 2014a). The EU doesn’t invest 
enough into general progress, and so into the welfare state, that is in what is called 
smart growth: higher education, innovation, R&D, info-communication technology 
and so on (GiddenS 2014) and this is true for the states, as well for private industries.
I signalled as a major opportunity the presence of a large population with sufficient 
computer literacy in young people, mainly in the use of social networks. This is not 
enough, because there is a generalised dissatisfaction among young people, shown by 
their retreat from active politics. Participation in elections is decreasing, while the so-
called brain drain continues to increase: our best and well-prepared young people are 
emigrating, looking for job at their level in the most advanced countries. They are not 
so much interested in the difficult building of an intercultural society in the EU: their 
rebellion is not political, but individual.
Without building an attractive European democracy, we foster the populist, anti-
EU movements, and i think that the best remedy is coming back to the ideas of the 
EU founders: i don’t mean the states, but the people who expressed the idea. To give 
an example, the USA is financially organised with a central bank, governing a unique 
currency: the only way to build a solid federative organisation. EU governance has a 
central bank, with national banks in all member countries (without the possibility to 
modify the international exchange rate) and different currencies. it took years to the 
central bank to reduce the debt of the impoverished states, with the strong opposition of 
the wealthy ones: fearing for the so-called stagflation, they make it nearly impossible 
for the poor countries to make productive investments.
This way, the threat will win over the opportunity, and the hope is that a road 
could open to a better-organised international association, whatever the cost, even with 
less members. The best moment to cut with the past and take a new road was probably 
soon after 1989, but Germany was still facing the problem of re-unification and re-
organisation of its federal structure, and could even think about leading the federation 
of Europe.
To conclude, more than 70 years have passed by since a small boy, at the end 
of World War ii, lived in Rome under german occupation. Today he still wishes for a 
powerful and peaceful EU association, confederation or federation; he thinks that this 
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can happen only if germany, today an economic and political giant, decides to take 
a lead in this direction. for this, a german chancellor is needed that cares more for 
common development, and less about ‘fiscal compact’ and economic austerity.
in any event, the old man that the small boy became would like to conclude as 
much as possible with a positive observation. in today’s EU, the most conservative 
movements want to stop the immigration of people not sharing our ‘Western values’: 
they simply (want to) ignore that these values are not accepted by the majority of EU 
inhabitants. for these (let me say: for us) the main value is the individual freedom to 
make decisions about their own life, the only limit being the freedom of the nearest 
neighbour (and of all other human beings).
9 afterword
The opinions I expressed are based on a huge flood of essays, press articles, radio 
and TV broadcasting: in the bulk i like to quote some of the ones, which exerted the 
maximum influence. Fundamental for the very latest events is the Italian geo-political 
monthly magazine limes and, to review the overall vision, the book of Anthony 
GiddenS “Turbulent and mighty continent” (2014).
Even before the introduction of Euro, bitter debates started among the monetary 
scholars, and are now at a climax. A positive view is expressed by guy SorMan: “Why 
Europe Will Rise Again”, in The Wall street Journal, 17th August 2012. Despite being 
a right-wing thinker, as the majority of today opponents, he is rather positive about the 
action of the European central Bank’s director in defending the Euro, and is guardedly 
upbeat when it comes to the future of it. Totally negative and stated in definitive terms 
is martin feldStein’s opinion in “The failure of the Euro”, in foreign Affairs, 13th 
December 2011. A similar rather unbalanced idea is Timothy Garton aSh’s one in 
“The crisis of Europe: how the Union came Together and Why it’s falling Apart”, in 
foreign Affairs, 20th August 2012.
more information can be taken by an article of shawn tull: “Two legends in 
economics wrestle over the euro’s future”, in cNN money – fortune, 9th August 2012, 
where the positions of Robert Mundell, Nobel Prize winner and main theorist of Euro, 
and of Allen Meltzer, one of the main opponents, are confronted.
since some months a growing number of experts have said that the global 
economic crisis has already reached its deepest point, and signs of improvement 
are now detectable. A very interesting general vision is offered by Klaus SchwaB, in 
“The Re-emergence of Europe”, Koeln, World Economic forum, 2012. Nothing to 
be amazed by his level of information and documentation: SchwaB is the founder and 
executive chairman of the Swiss non-profit organisation “World Economic Forum”. 
Well-known through its annual winter meeting in Davos, nowadays attracting more 
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than 2,500 participants (private business men and leaders of business companies at 
world top level), the 2015 forum Report is available online, but deals mainly with 
other problems.
A very interesting contribution was the article “What happened to Europe”, 
published on 2nd August 2012 in The New Republic, a magazine of politics and art 
commentaries, now in its 100th year. The author of the article is Amartya Sen, Professor 
in harvard and Nobel Prize winner.
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